India’s total exports rose to USD 714.73 billion in FY 2025–26 (April–January), giving the government a strong headline to project resilience and policy success. However, the deeper issue is whether this growth reflects durable structural strength or a well-framed official narrative. This critical analysis examines the export numbers, FTP 2023, RoDTEP, the Export Promotion Mission, FTAs, MSME support, and the geopolitical risks shaping India’s trade future.
New Delhi (ABC Live): The Union government’s export narrative rests on a simple argument: India’s trade performance has remained resilient despite global uncertainty, supply chain stress, and commodity volatility. According to the PIB release, total exports of merchandise and services rose by USD 36 billion in April–January FY 2025–26, moving from USD 679.02 billion to USD 714.73 billion, a growth of 5.26%. Over the longer period, exports reportedly increased from USD 497.90 billion in 2020–21 to USD 828.25 billion in 2024–25, with a stated 6.9% CAGR.
The official claim goes beyond numbers. It argues that India has built a supportive export ecosystem through FTP 2023, RoDTEP, the newly approved Export Promotion Mission with a ₹25,060 crore outlay, digital trade infrastructure, and an active market-access strategy through FTAs.
Why the USD 714.73 billion figure matters
The USD 714.73 billion headline is politically effective because it projects resilience and continuity at a time of fragile global trade conditions. It allows the government to present India as a strong and expanding trade actor even during external instability.
However, aggregate export numbers can also conceal as much as they reveal. The PIB text combines merchandise and services exports into one large total. That helps headline presentation, but it does not tell readers whether growth is broad-based across sectors, driven mainly by services, or concentrated in a few high-performing segments. For wider context, ABC Live had earlier examined India’s monthly trade position in this report: India Trade December 2025. That gap is important because long-term export strength depends on the quality, diversity, and resilience of the export basket, not only on the size of the top-line number.
The strongest part of the policy story
The most persuasive part of the official narrative is the move toward a layered export-support framework.
The PIB note describes FTP 2023 as a flexible policy built on four pillars: trade facilitation, export promotion, state-level partnerships, and digital integration. It also places RoDTEP at the centre of cost competitiveness by neutralising embedded taxes on exports. Alongside this, the Export Promotion Mission is designed around two pillars: Niryat Protsahan, focused on trade finance and credit enhancement, and Niryat Disha, focused on logistics, warehousing, and market access.
In addition, the government highlights a stronger digital backbone through platforms such as the 24×7 EIC interface, Trade Intelligence & Analytics platform, Common Digital Platform for Certificates of Origin, and Trade e-Connect portal. According to the PIB note, these systems support online processing, real-time compliance, digital certification, and easier access to market intelligence.
Taken together, this is a more credible export policy story than a slogan-driven approach. It suggests the government understands that exporters need credit, compliance ease, logistics, certification, and market access simultaneously.
Where the official narrative remains incomplete
Even so, the PIB note remains stronger on design than on proof.
It identifies the ₹25,060 crore Export Promotion Mission and describes its objectives. However, the text does not explain annual spending distribution, performance indicators, measurable exporter outcomes, or how much of the support will reach MSMEs in operational terms.
The same problem appears with the RELIEF Scheme. The idea is timely, especially in an era of geopolitical disruption. Yet the PIB text offers only a broad description. It says the scheme is a time-limited ECGC-linked intervention to address elevated export risks in the Gulf and West Asia maritime corridor. It does not spell out eligibility, premium support, claims timelines, scale of protection, or sectoral targeting.
That absence matters. Export risk protection is only as good as its operational delivery. A scheme may look robust in policy language but remain weak in commercial practice if the coverage is narrow or the claims process is slow.
FTAs, market access and the implementation challenge
The government also links export momentum to trade diplomacy. The PIB note says India has 19 FTAs and has concluded or advanced eight major agreements since 2021. It specifically highlights the India-EU FTA, the India-EFTA TEPA, and negotiations or agreements involving New Zealand, Oman, UK, Israel, Canada, GCC nations, Chile, and Peru.
This matters because modern trade agreements shape investment, services mobility, standards alignment, regulatory predictability, and value-chain integration. However, FTAs do not automatically create export competitiveness. Firms must still meet standards, manage logistics, secure finance, understand markets, and build scale. The PIB text itself indirectly acknowledges this by making MSME readiness and trade infrastructure central to the EPM framework.
So the real test is not how many agreements India signs. The real test is whether Indian exporters can actually use them at scale.
The hidden vulnerability behind export optimism
One of the most important signals in the PIB note is the government’s recognition that geopolitical disruption now requires a dedicated export-risk response. The RELIEF Scheme directly ties export policy to maritime instability in the Gulf and West Asia corridor.
That admission changes the policy picture. Export growth can no longer be analysed only through incentives and FTAs. It must also be read through shipping risks, insurance costs, route disruptions, and commercial uncertainty. In other words, India may be exporting more, but the strategic cost of maintaining export resilience is also increasing.
A sharper reading of the numbers
A 5.26% increase in total exports during April–January is positive. In a volatile global environment, it deserves recognition. Still, respectable growth is not the same as transformational growth. The PIB note presents the rise as evidence of broad-based resilience, but the text does not provide enough evidence on sectoral depth, product sophistication, or durable market-share gains to fully prove that case.
Similarly, the jump from USD 497.90 billion in 2020–21 to USD 828.25 billion in 2024–25 is substantial. Yet without clearer goods-versus-services breakup, sectoral composition, and utilisation evidence, the number remains a strong signal, not a complete verdict.
What this means for MSMEs
The PIB note repeatedly presents MSMEs as central beneficiaries of the new export ecosystem. That is significant because smaller exporters are often hit hardest by logistics shocks, freight instability, compliance costs, and credit gaps. The design of Niryat Protsahan and Niryat Disha appears intended to address exactly these pressures.
However, the success of this model will depend less on scheme announcements and more on last-mile usability. MSMEs often struggle not because support schemes do not exist, but because those schemes are fragmented, poorly explained, or difficult to access in practice. That remains one of the biggest tests for the government’s export strategy.
ABC Live’s take
The government’s export message deserves neither dismissal nor blind celebration.
On one hand, the PIB note shows a more serious policy architecture than many earlier export narratives. It combines export incentives, digital platforms, trade finance support, infrastructure thinking, and FTA-based market access. It also openly acknowledges geopolitical trade risk.
On the other hand, the note still reads more like a policy showcase than a full performance audit. It gives headline numbers, but not enough composition detail. It lists schemes, but not enough measurable outcomes. It invokes resilience, yet it also reveals growing vulnerability through the very need for the RELIEF Scheme.
That is why the fairest conclusion is this: India’s export story is improving, but the government’s case remains stronger on policy design than on fully demonstrated structural outcomes.
Conclusion
India’s export rise is real. The USD 714.73 billion figure for April–January FY 2025–26 is not trivial, and the broader multi-year trajectory also points to meaningful expansion.
However, the next stage of the debate must move beyond celebration. It must ask whether India is deepening sectoral competitiveness, expanding FTA utilisation, strengthening MSME participation, and building durable resilience against geopolitical trade shocks. Until those questions are answered with greater clarity, the export story remains promising, but not beyond scrutiny.
















