New Delhi (ABC Live): The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr S. Mohan v. Secretary to the Chancellor, Puducherry Technological University (2026 INSC 100) marks a decisive moment in India’s higher-education governance law. The ruling examines how far Union-level regulation of educational standards can shape and control the appointment of Vice-Chancellors in State and Union Territory universities. More importantly, it directly confronts long-standing concerns over executive dominance, diluted statutory safeguards, and recurring litigation surrounding university leadership.

At a structural level, the Court adopted a calibrated and balanced approach. It first declared the appointment process illegal because it violated mandatory UGC Regulations. At the same time, the bench invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to permit the incumbent Vice-Chancellor to continue in office. Through this twin approach, the judgment combines strict constitutional enforcement with pragmatic institutional protection.

Factual and Procedural Background

Puducherry Technological University came into existence under the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019. Section 14(5) of the Act prescribed the method for constituting a Search-cum-Selection Committee to appoint the Vice-Chancellor. Relying on this provision, the authorities constituted a committee that excluded a nominee of the Chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC). In addition, the committee included the Secretary (Higher & Technical Education), Government of Puducherry.

In December 2021, the University appointed Dr S. Mohan as Vice-Chancellor for a fixed tenure of five years. Soon thereafter, aggrieved parties approached the Madras High Court through writ petitions. These petitions challenged both the legality of the appointment and the constitutional validity of Section 14(5) of the PTU Act. After examining the statutory framework, the High Court struck down the provision as ultra vires the UGC Regulations, 2018, and invalidated the appointment. Nevertheless, to avoid an administrative vacuum, the Court allowed temporary continuation.

Dissatisfied with this outcome, the parties carried the dispute to the Supreme Court through special leave petitions under Article 136.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court examined four core questions:

• Whether the UGC Regulations, 2018—especially Regulation 7.3—bind State and Union Territory universities.
• Whether the composition of a Search-cum-Selection Committee forms part of “standards in higher education” under Entry 66 of List I.
• Whether Section 14(5) of the PTU Act failed due to repugnancy under Article 254 or due to lack of legislative competence.
• Whether a finding of illegality necessarily requires immediate removal from office.

Constitutional Framework and Legislative Competence

A. Entry 66, List I and Entry 25, List III

At the constitutional level, education falls within Entry 25 of the Concurrent List. However, that power operates expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I, which grants Parliament exclusive authority over the coordination and determination of standards in higher education. Consequently, UGC Regulations framed under the UGC Act, 1956 derive binding force from Entry 66 and override inconsistent State or Union Territory laws.

Crucially, the bench rejected the argument that Vice-Chancellor appointments constitute mere internal administration. Instead, the Court emphasised that the selection process directly affects academic standards, governance quality, and institutional autonomy. For this reason, the Court treated the composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee as an enforceable national standard.

B. Why Article 254 Did Not Apply

The judgment also introduced an important doctrinal clarification. On the issue of repugnancy, the Court held that Article 254 had no application at all. Since UGC Regulations occupy a field reserved exclusively for Parliament under List I, inconsistent State or Union Territory provisions fail for want of legislative competence. As a result, questions concerning Presidential assent under Article 254(2) lost relevance.

Through this reasoning, the Court aligned the analysis with settled constitutional doctrine and removed confusion that frequently clouds education-law disputes.

Illegality in the Appointment Process

A. Absence of a UGC Nominee

Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 mandates the inclusion of a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, in every Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointing a Vice-Chancellor. In the present case, the authorities failed to include such representation. The Court treated this omission as a substantive violation rather than a procedural lapse. Consequently, the defect struck at the root of the appointment.

B. Conflict of Interest in Committee Composition

The Court then turned to the independence of the committee. Regulation 7.3(ii) requires committee members to have no connection with the concerned university. However, the inclusion of the Secretary (Higher & Technical Education), Government of Puducherry—who also served as Pro-Chancellor and had prior institutional association—created a clear conflict of interest. This finding reinforced the need to insulate university leadership appointments from executive influence.

C. Invalidity of Section 14(5) of the PTU Act

Because Section 14(5) permitted a committee structure inconsistent with UGC norms, the Court declared the provision ultra vires to that extent. In doing so, it reaffirmed that State or Union Territory legislation cannot dilute or bypass Central standards framed under a constitutionally exclusive field.

Application of Quo Warranto Principles

Although the writ petitions were not formally styled as quo warranto proceedings, classic quo warranto reasoning guided the Court’s analysis. The inquiry focused strictly on statutory compliance and legal authority to hold office. Notably, the bench deliberately refrained from examining personal suitability, integrity, or performance.

Article 142 and Continuation in Office

Once illegality was established, attention shifted to consequences. At this stage, several mitigating factors emerged. No allegation questioned the Vice-Chancellor’s qualifications or integrity. Moreover, the University had continued to function without disruption during his tenure.

For these reasons, the Court invoked Article 142 to do complete justice. It allowed the Vice-Chancellor to continue until the end of his normal tenure or until a fresh appointment is made in accordance with law. In addition, the Court clarified that he could participate in any new selection process without prejudice.

This approach reflects a conscious effort to balance rule-of-law discipline with institutional stability.

Critical Evaluation

A. Key Strengths

At a doctrinal level, the judgment firmly establishes UGC Regulations as binding national standards under Entry 66. At the same time, it places meaningful limits on executive control over university leadership. Furthermore, the Court’s clear exclusion of Article 254 strengthens constitutional coherence in education-law jurisprudence.

B. Areas of Concern

Nevertheless, the outcome raises legitimate concerns. Allowing continuation despite a clear finding of illegality may weaken deterrence against future statutory violations. In addition, repeated reliance on Article 142 risks uncertainty in cases traditionally governed by quo warranto remedies. Over time, such balancing may blur the line between illegality and equitable tolerance.

Broader Implications

For universities, UGC norms on Vice-Chancellor appointments now operate as binding law rather than advisory guidelines. For governments and legislatures, the judgment signals an urgent need to align university statutes with UGC Regulations. Meanwhile, litigators gain a clearer Entry 66-based framework for future challenges.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Dr S. Mohan stands as a landmark in higher-education governance. The judgment reinforces constitutional discipline over university appointments while acknowledging institutional realities. How future benches manage the balance between legality and continuity will shape the credibility of governance reform across India’s university system.

📌 Key Takeaways of Dr S. Mohan’s case.

• VC appointments form part of constitutional “standards” under Entry 66.
• UGC Regulations override inconsistent State and UT university laws.
• Article 254 does not apply where Parliament occupies an exclusive field.
• Conflicted selection committees render appointments illegal.
• Quo warranto logic applies even without a formal writ.
• Article 142 may soften consequences, but cannot cure illegality.

📌 Why Dr S. Mohan’s Judgment Matters

Universities must now treat VC appointment norms as binding law. Governments face immediate statutory alignment obligations. Courts and litigators gain clarity on Entry 66 enforcement. Overall, higher-education governance moves decisively toward independence and transparency.

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