New Delhi (ABC Live): India’s Constitution gives law-making power to Parliament. However, in daily governance, that power now works mainly through subordinate legislation—rules, regulations, notices, and executive orders issued by the executive. As a result, the 2025 Report of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation sends a clear warning: executive rule-making no longer faces strong parliamentary control.

Importantly, although the report reviews the Department of Fisheries, its impact reaches far beyond one Ministry. Instead, it exposes a deeper and growing gap between executive power and legislative control.

Why Subordinate Legislation Now Runs Real Governance

While Parliament passes laws, in practice, subordinate legislation decides how those laws work on the ground. For instance, it controls:

• Licensing and approvals
• Penalties and fines
• Inspection systems
• Public hiring rules
• Day-to-day powers of officials

Therefore, when rules remain unfinished, laws stay weak. Likewise, when Ministries fail to place rules before Parliament, public review collapses. Most importantly, when records go missing, accountability ends.

At the same time, this pattern now appears across sectors. For example, even business rule changes often arrive through notices, as ABC Live showed in its report on the new MSME definition:
👉 https://abclive.in/2025/11/06/new-msme-definition/

The Most Serious Finding: “Records Not Traceable”

Most critically, the report reveals that the Government cannot trace when it placed the Coastal Aquaculture Authority Regulations, 2008, before Parliament.

This lapse goes far beyond a file error. In constitutional terms, parliamentary laying allows lawmakers to test the legality and fairness of executive rules. Without it, no real check exists.

Later, the Ministry placed the Regulations before Parliament in 2025—17 years late. However, this late step does not fix the original failure.

As a result, the coastal aquaculture sector ran for nearly two decades under rules that never faced verified parliamentary review.

Article 309 Recruitment Rules: Executive Ease vs Constitutional Control

At the same time, the Committee found serious problems in how the Fisheries Ministry used Article 309 of the Constitution to frame Recruitment Rules for four institutes:

• Fishery Survey of India
• Central Institute of Fisheries, Nautical and Engineering Training
• Central Institute of Coastal Engineering for Fishery
• National Institute of Fisheries Post-Harvest Technology

In particular:

• These bodies do not operate as full statutory bodies
• Yet the Ministry used Article 309 to frame its service rules
• Moreover, it did not promptly place those rules before Parliament
• Meanwhile, the DoPT said laying was “not mandatory”
• However, the Parliamentary Procedure Manual directly states that such rules must be laid

Consequently, this clash shows how the executive now treats legislative checks as optional. Although the Government later placed several Recruitment Rules before Parliament between 2023 and 2024, the deeper legal question remains open:

Can non-statutory bodies lawfully use Article 309 at all?

Until then, public service rules remain open to uneven use and legal challenge.

Maritime Zones Act Gap: Law Without Its Own Procedure

Meanwhile, the Committee also found a major gap under Section 25(2)(f) of the Maritime Zones of India Act, 1981.

Although the law requires a fixed form for vessel release:

• The Ministry produced no such form
• Moreover, it cited no valid notice
• Finally, it proved no parliamentary laying

Because of this, officers now act without a clear legal process. In turn, this creates:

• Wide room for choice
• Weak rule control
• High risk of misuse

SLHS Platform: Digital Tool Without Legal Force

In September 2025, the Lok Sabha Secretariat rolled out the Subordinate Legislation Handling System (SLHS).

On the one hand, the platform offers a helpful record tool. On the other hand, it still suffers from clear limits:

• It lacks legal backing
• It imposes no duty to update
• It sets no penalty for non-use

For this reason, SLHS works as a data store—nothing more. As things stand, it does not yet force real compliance.

The “67% Compliance” Claim: What the Number Hides

The report claims that 67% of its steps won acceptance by the Government.

Yet, in real terms, “accepted” often means:

• Under review
• Under talks between Ministries
• Under file movement

By contrast, true compliance demands four steps:

• Final notice
• Proof of laying in Parliament
• Public online access
• Secure record keeping

Because these steps remain missing in many cases, the score gives a false sense of success.

A Pattern That Refuses to Change

The 2025 report does not stand alone. For years, earlier Committee reports in Environment, Health, Transport, and Labour raised the same warnings.

In short, Parliament warns, but the executive delays.

How Other Democracies Control Executive Rules

By comparison, although India follows the Westminster model, its control tools remain weaker than those of global peers.

United Kingdom

For example, lawmakers can block faulty rules using fatal motions.

United States

Similarly, under the Congressional Review Act, Congress can cancel executive rules within a fixed time.

Australia

Likewise, the Senate can trigger automatic rule withdrawal.

Canada

Meanwhile, a Joint Committee runs steady checks and can force changes.

India’s Key Weak Spots

Even so, India still lacks:

• Automatic rule invalidation
• Time-bound sunset limits
• Officer-level liability
• Direct veto power
• An independent rule-review body

As a result, executive-made law now runs with low fear of real legal penalty.

Oversight Without Penalties: The Central Problem

Despite clear faults, the Committee:

• Sets no binding deadlines
• Recommends no fines or service penalties
• Imposes no personal duty on officers
• Orders have no automatic rule cancellation

Therefore, parliamentary oversight now guides—but does not compel.

Conclusion: A Direct Test of Parliamentary Power

Ultimately, the 2025 Subordinate Legislation Report sends a direct message: unchecked executive rule-making now challenges Parliament’s authority. India’s crisis does not lie in writing laws—instead, it lies in forcing respect for the rules that follow.

Until India brings in:

• Firm time limits for rule-making
• Automatic rule cancellation for violations
• Direct officer accountability
• A strong, independent rule watchdog

Subordinate legislation will continue to operate in a grey zone where power grows faster than control.