New Delhi (ABC Live): Ninety-six per cent of India’s international internet traffic travels through a handful of fibre-optic cables buried under the Bay of Bengal. These cables carry financial transactions, military routes, intelligence and civilian communication. Despite their importance, India stations more warships guarding the surface above them than submarines monitoring the seabed below them (Recorded Future, 2025). Therefore, India continues building submarines designed mainly for ship warfare, even though the next critical battleground is shifting to seabed infrastructure, data routes, and unmanned systems.

Consequently, a Swedish submarine — Saab’s A26 — becomes surprisingly relevant. It matters not because India intends to buy it, but because it represents exactly the kind of warfare India is not preparing for (Reuters, 2025).

Saab’s A26: A Submarine Built to Influence, Not Just Attack

Traditional submarines hunt ships using torpedoes. By contrast, Saab’s A26 hunts information. Thanks to a Stirling AIP system and a 1.5-meter bow mission portal, the A26 can deploy drones, divers and seabed sensors. Instead of firing weapons alone, it shapes underwater environments quietly (Saab, 2025).

The future underwater war will be won by access, not attack.

Because influence requires stealth, the A26 uses endurance to control the seabed, not merely to hide from sonar. This subtle shift transforms submarines from hunters into hidden command nodes.

The Glamour Trap

Nuclear submarines generate headlines and political prestige. Seabed defence does not.
Consequently, India invests in visibility, not resilience — even though invisibility will define the next conflict.

India Has the Digital Tools — But Not the Doctrine

India already possesses a key building block for the future: IRSA 1.0 software-defined radio (SDR). It can merge naval, satellite, UUV and surveillance data into one encrypted network. Yet, without UUV integration, IRSA becomes a radio without a strategy. It is praised as an innovation, but it is not being used as a doctrine for seabed defence.

In fact, unless India links IRSA to UUV swarms and seabed sensors, it will continue building submarines that fight old wars.
ABC Live coverage of IRSA:
https://abclive.in/2025/10/08/drdo-irsa-1-0-india-sdr-architecture/

The Invisible Fleet

Globally, the fastest-growing naval investment isn’t torpedoes.
It is UUVs — underwater drones that map, monitor and manipulate the seabed.
China leads. The U.S. follows. India is still experimenting.

AIP Without Influence Is a Trophy, Not a Capability

India celebrates its indigenous AIP programme as a standalone achievement. However, AIP matters only if it helps submarines quietly command UUVs for extended periods. Saab’s A26 uses AIP for tactical loitering and seabed control, not just long-duration hiding (Naval News, 2025).

Capability	India’s Direction	A26 Reality
AIP	Trophy achievement	Tactical loitering
Stealth	Avoid sonar	Avoid all spectra
Torpedoes	Central weapon	Secondary role
Sensors	Self-defence	Infrastructure dominance

Therefore, India is developing quiet submarines with no clear mission for quiet influence.

Regional Stakes: China, Pakistan and India

China: Mapping First, Fighting Later

China deploys research vessels, UUVs and seabed sensors across the Indo-Pacific. Although labelled “scientific,” these missions map chokepoints, energy fields and cable routes. Thus, China is preparing for a war of data and infrastructure before shots are fired (ISS, 2024). Saab’s A26 design shows how silently India could shadow these survey vessels and deter infrastructure sabotage.

Pakistan: Missiles Over Infrastructure

Pakistan prioritises missile-capable submarines. Nevertheless, it invests little in cable security, UUV fleets or offshore rig surveillance. Therefore, its deterrence is theatrical but shallow. Saab’s A26 exposes the flaw: a nation cannot deter at sea if it cannot secure its underwater lifelines.

India: A Superpower That Cannot Yet See Beneath Its Waters

India sits between China’s mapping strategy and Pakistan’s missile obsession. Yet, it suffers from fragmentation:

Project-75I ignores mission bays and UUV integration
IRSA is treated as a gadget, not a doctrine
DPSU shipyards profit from delays, not rapid capability deployment
Undersea cables remain economically vital but unprotected

Consequently, India has strong ambitions but weak seabed awareness.

What Happens When a Cable Is Cut?

A future attack on India may begin as a “technical fault” at a cable landing site.
Without underwater detection, India may not even know it has been attacked.

India Doesn’t Need Saab’s A26 — It Must Learn From It

✔ 1. Redefine Submarine Missions

Submarines must defend infrastructure, not only sink ships. This requires UUV deployment, cable patrols, covert seabed mapping and protective vigilance near rigs and chokepoints.

✔ 2. Mandate Mission Bays

All future submarines should include A26-style multi-mission portals, along with UUV launch and recovery systems.

✔ 3. Use IRSA as a Command Doctrine

IRSA must become the nervous system of UUV swarms, seabed sensors and submarine coordination.

✔ 4. Create a Seabed Warfare Cell

India must build a naval unit linking defence, telecom, intelligence and energy ministries to secure the seabed infrastructure.

✔ 5. Reform Procurement Incentives

Shipyards should be rewarded for deployment speed and capability integration, not for delays that inflate project length.

✔ 6. Use Quad and European Partnerships

India should cooperate with Sweden, Norway, Japan, the U.S. and Australia to jointly secure cable routes and seabed assets.

Summary Table: A26 as India’s Strategic Lesson

National Need	A26 Lesson	India Must Do
Undersea influence	Mission Bay + UUVs	Make drones standard
Infrastructure defence	Seabed sensors	Build a seabed doctrine
Quiet endurance	Tactical loitering	Use AIP to command, not hide
Digital stealth	SDR integration	Expand IRSA into UUV networks
Indo-Pacific strategy	Silent mapping	Map chokepoints proactively

Conclusion: The War India Isn’t Preparing For

Saab’s A26 is not a purchase option for India. Instead, it serves as a warning label. It shows that the next decisive undersea conflict will not target ships, but data, energy and seabed influence. China has already moved in this direction. Pakistan remains distracted by missile theatre. India has the technology to lead — but only if it applies it to the war that is coming, not the war that traditions keep repeating.