Explained: How SC Used Article145 in Rejanish K.V. Vs K. Deepa

In Legal, SCJudgments
October 28, 2025
Dinesh Singh Rawat
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The Rejanish K.V. ruling clarified eligibility under Article 233(2) but also tested the Supreme Court’s own boundaries. By using Article 145(3) in a review petition, the Court turned a settled issue into a fresh constitutional trial.

New Delhi (ABC Live): Every few years, a Supreme Court judgment quietly shifts the balance between judicial power and procedural restraint. The recent Constitution Bench decision in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa is one such turning point.

What began as a dispute over eligibility for District Judge appointments evolved into a deeper question about how far the Supreme Court can go when it reviews its own final decisions. The ruling expanded who can apply for judicial positions, but also expanded the Court’s own reach under Articles 137 and 145(3) of the Constitution.

This explainer traces how the Court used a review petition to reopen a matter it had already decided five years earlier, why this matters for judicial discipline and finality, and what it means for India’s constitutional architecture in the years ahead.

Background: When a Review Became a Re-Trial

On 22 October 2025, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict in Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa. The case interpreted Article 233(2) of the Constitution, which governs the appointment of District Judges.

The Bench held that a judicial officer with a combined experience of seven years as both an advocate and a judicial officer can apply for direct recruitment through the bar quota.

The substantive outcome broadened opportunity and modernised India’s bar-to-bench pathway. Yet the procedure was extraordinary. The Court reopened a final judgment (Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, 2020) and used Article 145(3) to justify a fresh constitutional hearing within review jurisdiction. This choice blurred the line between judicial correction and re-litigation.

The Jurisdictional Twist: From Dheeraj Mor to Rejanish K.V. **

The issue originated in 2018 after conflicting High Court views on bar-quota eligibility. A two-judge bench in Dheeraj Mor asked the Chief Justice to refer it to a larger bench. A three-judge bench led by Justice Arun Mishra then ruled that serving judicial officers could not apply as advocates. The decision stood settled for five years.

Later, review petitions challenged not the logic but the composition of the bench. The petitioners argued that a case involving a constitutional question should have been heard by five judges. In Rejanish K.V., the Supreme Court accepted that view and invoked Article 145(3). By doing so, it expanded review jurisdiction and heard the matter de novo, as if deciding a fresh constitutional reference.

Article 145(3): Between Procedure and Power

Article 145(3) requires that any case raising a “substantial question of constitutional law” be heard by at least five judges. Yet such referrals depend on the Chief Justice’s administrative discretion, not automatic rules.

The Rejanish K.V. bench interpreted this power broadly, creating three concerns:

Misidentifying the Trigger

The Dheeraj Mor order never mentioned Article 145(3). It only asked for an “appropriate bench.” Treating it retroactively as a Constitution Bench reference changes its meaning and undermines procedural certainty.

Contradicting Settled Law

Earlier cases — State of J&K v. Thakur Singh (1968) and Bhagwan Swarup Lal v. State of Maharashtra (1965) — make it clear that Article 145(3) applies only when a constitutional question remains unsettled. A finalised interpretation cannot be reopened under a new label of “substantial question.”

Blurring Review and Curative Jurisdiction

Article 137 permits review for clear errors. In contrast, curative petitions, defined in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002), exist to address rare miscarriages of justice. By re-hearing the entire matter without invoking curative jurisdiction, the Court merged these distinct powers and weakened finality.

Institutional Implications: Pandora’s Box of Reopenings

A. Precedential Instability

If Rejanish K.V. stands as precedent, many three-judge rulings on constitutional issues could be contested for bench size. Such retroactive claims would erode the finality of Supreme Court judgments.

B. Access-to-Justice Concerns

Constitution Benches are rare and resource-heavy. If every “substantial question” requires five judges, pending constitutional cases could multiply, slowing justice delivery.

C. Administrative Uncertainty

The ruling also tests the Master of the Roster principle. If the Chief Justice’s bench assignments can be declared invalid later, administrative stability within the Court itself comes under strain.

Reading Between the Lines: Correctness vs. Finality

Supporters believe the Court prioritised constitutional accuracy over technical limits. Yet such a view confuses vigilance with overreach.

The key question is not whether the five-judge interpretation is sound, but whether the Court respected its own boundaries. By reopening Dheeraj Mor, it suggested that finality is flexible whenever correctness is doubted. This approach may strengthen constitutional reasoning but weakens predictability — the bedrock of judicial authority.

Why ABC Live Is Publishing This Explainer Now

The Rejanish K.V. verdict is not a routine appointment case. It reflects how the Supreme Court defines its own limits and balances two principles — finality and fairness.

At a time when judicial transparency and institutional discipline are under public scrutiny, understanding the relationship between Articles 145(3) and 137 is vital. This decision invites a larger question: Should constitutional correctness always override judicial finality, and who draws that line?