New Delhi (ABC Live): After-sales policies rarely make headlines in competition law. Yet the recent order of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) against Intel Corporation shows why they matter. By fining Intel ₹27.38 crore for its India-Specific Warranty Policy on boxed microprocessors, CCI has made it clear that warranty terms can reshape markets just as powerfully as pricing or exclusivity contracts.

More importantly, the decision signals a deeper shift. CCI is no longer focused only on formal violations. Instead, it is steadily moving toward an effects-based approach, where the real impact on consumers and market structure becomes central.

This approach mirrors CCI’s evolving merger-control practice. For instance, in its approval of ENBD’s acquisition of RBL Bank, the regulator emphasised future competition risks and consumer impact rather than narrow structural thresholds (see ABC Live’s explainer: https://abclive.in/2026/01/21/cci-approval-of-enbd-rbl-bank-acquisition/). The Intel order applies the same logic to unilateral conduct.

What Intel’s India-Specific Warranty Policy Did

From 25 April 2016, Intel adopted a policy under which warranty claims in India for Intel Boxed Microprocessors were accepted only if the product was purchased from an authorised Indian distributor.

Consequently, even if a processor was purchased from an authorised Intel distributor abroad, Indian consumers could not claim a warranty in India. They were redirected to the country of purchase.

In practice, this meant that parallel imports became commercially unattractive, and Indian consumers were locked into a narrower set of domestic channels.

How the Case Reached CCI

The proceedings began with an information filed by Matrix Info Systems Private Limited under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002. The informant alleged that Intel’s policy discriminated against Indian buyers and restricted legitimate cross-border sourcing.

After investigation, CCI passed its order on 12 February 2026 under Section 27 of the Act.

Market Structure Snapshot: Desktop Boxed Microprocessors (India)

Why this matters:
Sustained market share above 70%, combined with strong ecosystem lock-in,n strongly supports a finding of dominance.

Why CCI Found the Policy Discriminatory

CCI compared Intel’s India warranty policy with its policies in China, Australia, and most other jurisdictions.

India was the clear outlier. CCI therefore held that Intel treated Indian consumers less favourably without objective justification.

Impact on Consumer Choice

As a result, practical consumer choice was almost halved.

Parallel Imports: Why They Matter

Parallel imports introduce price discipline. They also prevent artificial territorial segmentation. By making warranty unavailable for imported boxed processors, Intel effectively neutralised this competitive pressure.

CCI’s order, therefore, reaffirms an important principle: dominant firms cannot use after-sales policies to re-partition markets.

Estimated Consumer Welfare Loss (Illustrative)

Assumptions (conservative):

• Annual boxed CPU sales: 8 million units

• Average price per unit: ₹12,000

• Price effect from reduced competition: 2%

Even under cautious assumptions, likely consumer harm far exceeds the penalty imposed.

Penalty vs Harm

This raises concerns about underdeterrence.

Mitigation and Its Limits

CCI reduced the penalty because Intel discontinued the policy with effect from 1 April 2024.

While voluntary correction should be encouraged, the policy remained in force for nearly eight years. A large reduction, therefore, risks sending the message that firms can delay compliance and still secure substantial leniency.

Remedies: Largely Forward-Looking

CCI directed Intel to:

• Publicise the withdrawal of the policy

• Submit a compliance report

However, the order does not require consumer restitution, independent audits, or periodic monitoring.

Why This Order Is Still a Turning Point

Despite its limitations, the order is important because it establishes that:

1. Warranty and service policies can constitute abuse of dominance.
2. Territorial segmentation through after-sales restrictions is high-risk.
3. CCI is moving toward an effects-based enforcement model in technology markets.

Conclusion

The penalty on Intel is normatively sound and pro-consumer. It strengthens the idea that dominant firms must compete on merit, not on restrictive after-sales rules.

At the same time, stronger economic analysis, clearer penalty calibration, and deeper remedies would improve deterrence.

Bottom line:
CCI has taken a decisive step in regulating the competitive impact of post-sale conduct in tech markets. The next step must be to match strong principles with equally strong enforcement tools.