India’s Market Intelligence Reports capture food inflation signals well in advance, yet fail to trigger timely action. Using January 2025 wheat and mustard case studies, this investigation shows how data-rich dashboards without predictive triggers leave food inflation foreseeable—but repeatedly unmanaged.
New Delhi (ABC Live): Food inflation in India is often portrayed as sudden and unavoidable. However, a closer reading of official government data reveals a very different reality. Inflation is rarely unpredictable; instead, it is repeatedly anticipated—yet institutionally unmanaged. Each price spike appears to surprise households and policymakers alike, even though warning signals were visible weeks, and sometimes months, in advance.
At the centre of this paradox lie India’s Market Intelligence Reports (MIRs). Month after month, these reports compile granular data on production, procurement, stocks, arrivals, prices, inflation, and trade. In theory, such a system should operate as an early-warning radar. In practice, it functions more like a post-event recorder. Consequently, India does not suffer from a lack of information; rather, it suffers from a failure to convert information into timely, binding decisions.
This gap matters because food inflation is not merely an economic statistic; it has significant implications for the broader economy. Instead, it is a governance stress test. When staple prices rise, household budgets tighten, nutritional outcomes worsen, and political credibility erodes. Therefore, a system that can see inflation forming—but cannot act before it crystallises—represents a structural weakness in economic management.
That weakness becomes unmistakable when Market Intelligence Reports are read not as routine statistical briefs, but as forensic evidence. In January 2025, two MIRs—one on wheat and another on mustard (rapeseed and edible oils)—captured inflationary pressures with striking clarity. Yet, neither report triggered proportionate preventive action. As a result, inflation followed a familiar path: foreseeable, delayed in response, and costly to correct.
What Are Agriculture Market Intelligence Reports?
Market Intelligence Reports are monthly commodity briefs published through the Unified Portal for Agricultural Statistics (UPAg). They consolidate official datasets from DA&FW, FCI, NAFED, Agmarknet, DOCA, MOSPI, and DGCIS, alongside selective global benchmarks.
The full set of official Market Intelligence Reports is publicly accessible on the Government of India’s UPAg platform
🔗 External reference: https://upag.gov.in/primary-estimate-report?tab=Market+Intelligence+Reports
In theory, therefore, MIRs should:
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identify early supply–demand stress,
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guide procurement, stock release, and trade policy, and
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prevent routine volatility from turning into inflation.
In practice, however, MIRs remain descriptive summaries. They explain what has already happened. Yet, they rarely specify what must happen next, by when, or under what trigger conditions. Consequently, intelligence remains observational rather than predictive.
Policy Context: Why This Failure Matters in 2025
The timing of this failure is particularly significant. As ABC Live has earlier analysed in its review of the New National Agricultural Policy, 2025, India’s farm governance is moving toward data-driven, market-linked decision-making. However, unless intelligence tools themselves are redesigned, policy ambition will outpace institutional capacity.
🔗 ABC Live internal link:
https://abclive.in/2025/08/02/new-national-agricultural-policy-2025/
In other words, without predictive market intelligence, even the most reform-oriented agricultural policy risks becoming reactive rather than preventive.
CASE STUDY I — Market Intelligence Report Wheat (January 2025)
When Excess Stocks Failed to Cool Prices
Wheat Availability Snapshot
| Indicator | January 2025 |
|---|---|
| Production (2023–24, Final Estimate) | 1,132.92 LMT |
| FCI wheat stock | 184.11 LMT |
| Buffer norm (January) | 138.00 LMT |
| Surplus over buffer | +46.11 LMT |
| Procurement (RMS 2024–25) | 265.94 LMT |
| Exports (FY 2024–25 till Aug) | 0.02 LMT |
Interpretation:
Wheat availability was comfortably surplus. Neither production nor exports justified market tightness.
Wheat Prices & Inflation Signals
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| MSP | ₹2,275 / qtl |
| Mandi modal price | ₹2,939.69 / qtl |
| Mandi–MSP gap | +29.22% |
| Retail wheat price | ₹3,528.24 / qtl |
| Wheat atta CPI inflation | 7.84% |
Why the MIR failed:
The MIR recorded the price–stock contradiction but did not translate it into mandatory stock-release or market-intervention triggers. As a result, surplus wheat coexisted with inflation.
CASE STUDY II — Market Intelligence Report Mustard/Edible Oils (January 2025)
When Stable Farm Prices Masked Severe Consumer Inflation
Rapeseed & Mustard Production & Farm-Gate Stability
| Indicator | January 2025 |
|---|---|
| Production (2023–24) | 132.59 LMT |
| Increase vs 5-year average | +24.63% |
| MSP | ₹5,650 / qtl |
| Mandi modal price | ₹5,805.84 / qtl |
| Price above MSP | +2.76% |
Mustard Oil Prices & Inflation Stress
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Retail mustard oil price | ₹17,087.66 / qtl |
| CPI inflation (mustard oil) | 18.67% |
| WPI inflation (mustard oil) | ≈26% |
Why the MIR failed:
The report acknowledged import dependence but did not decompose inflation across seed prices, processing margins, import parity, and retail mark-ups—leaving policymakers without a predictive response framework.
ABC Live Data Box: Global Comparison — Why India’s MIRs Fall Short
| Dimension | India – MIR (UPAg) | Food and Agriculture Organisation | United States Department of Agriculture | Agricultural Market Information System |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Output type | Descriptive | Alert-based | Predictive | Scenario-based |
| Forecast horizon | Backward-looking | Short-term risk | Forward-looking | Crisis scenarios |
| Trigger thresholds | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Decision accountability | Weak | Moderate | Strong | Moderate |
Interpretation:
India collects data at a scale comparable to global peers. However, unlike FAO, USDA, or AMIS, India’s MIRs do not embed triggers, forecasts, or consequences.
Final ABC Live Takeaway
India’s agriculture market intelligence does not fail because it lacks data. It fails because data carries no binding consequence.
Until Market Intelligence Reports are redesigned as predictive, trigger-based, and decision-binding tools, food inflation will remain foreseeable—yet repeatedly unmanaged, regardless of broader agricultural policy reforms.

















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